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The Case of Italy 
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decompose overall inequality in an ”ethically offensive” and an ”ethically acceptable” part. 
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in a sample of 15-year old students. In both circumstances we find that the less developed 
regions in the South are characterized by greater incidence of inequality of opportunity. 
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1 Motivation
Equality of opportunity (EOp) seems to be the prevailing conception of social
justice in western liberal societies (Roemer, 1998). Indeed, this idea has been
defended and put forward by a number of scholars in recent years, both in the
area of political philosophy and normative economics ( see Arneson 1989, Barry
1991, Cohen 1989, Dworkin 1981a,b, Rawls 1971, Roemer 1993) . According
to the opportunity egalitarian view, what the principle of justice requires is
not equality of individuals’ final achievements; once the means or opportunities
to reach a valuable outcome have been equally split, which particular oppor-
tunity, from those open to her, the individual chooses, is outside the scope of
justice. The EOp view combines features of libertarianism and egalitarianism.
From the former it borrows the requirement that public policies should be neu-
tral with respect to private goals that motivate individuals in their lives. But,
out of egalitarian inspiration, it seeks a genuine equality in conditions that are
beyond the individual control. Actually, recent work in the field of axiomatic
normative theory1 has shown that the ideal of EOp can be decomposed into two
distinct - and sometimes conflicting - ethical principles: the first, egalitarian in
spirit, states that diﬀerences in individual achievements which can be unambigu-
ously attributed to diﬀerences in factors beyond the individual responsibility,
are inequitable and to be compensated by society; this is called the Principle
of Compensation. On the other hand, diﬀerences of achievements which can be
attributed to factors within the personal responsibility are equitable and should
not to be compensated; this is the Principle of Responsibility.
Although the large consensus gained by the opportunity egalitarian view, it
is a common practice among economist that of evaluating social inequities by
looking at the degree of income inequality or, in alternative, at the degree of
income poverty in the society.
In our view, the analysis of opportunity inequality in a society, in addition
to being interesting per se, has also an instrumental value: studying how the
opportunity inequality in a given country evolves over time can help to better
understand the genesis of the income inequalities; a reduction in the opportu-
nity inequality can indicate a social improvement, ceteris paribus. Moreover,
studying the diﬀerential intensity of opportunity inequality across regional ar-
eas, professional categories or even income classes, can give clearer information
on the priorities of a redistributive policy.
In this paper we make an eﬀort to propose and apply new measurement
tools which are coherent with the opportunity egalitarian ethics. The aim of the
paper is twofold. The fist goal is to provide a theoretically sound methodology
to measure opportunity inequality and to decompose overall inequality in an
”ethically oﬀensive” and an ”ethically acceptable” part. The second goal is to
provide an empirical application of these new evaluation tools, and to show how
they compare with standard methods of income inequality measurement and
opportunity inequality measurement. We believe that our analysis is able to
1See Bossert 1995, Fleurbaey 1994,1995 and for recent surveys Fleurbaey and Maniquet
2003 and Peragine 1999.
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shed some light on aspects otherwise undetected and undetectable by previous
distributional analysis.
In the empirical part of the paper we compared two Italian macro-regions,
South and Centre-North, according to equality of opportunity. In the first
application we focus on individual earnings, while in the second we consider the
distribution of cognitive abilities among students; in both cases we evaluate the
actual distributions of the two macro-regions on the basis of diﬀerent notions of
equality of opportunity.
2 The approach
The theory of equality of opportunity poses two diﬀerent economic issues: the
first is the design of a public policy intended to implement the EOp view2; the
second is the problem of measuring the degree of opportunity inequality and
ranking social states in terms of equality of opportunity3.
The focus of the present paper is on this second issue. In a social ordering
framework, the principle of compensation can be expressed by stating the rele-
vance of the circumstances-based inequalities; while the responsibility principle
is expressed by stating the irrelevance of the eﬀort-based inequalities. Hence the
aim becomes one of seeking inequality orderings which are sensitive with respect
to the former, but express neutrality with regard to the latter inequalities.
The model we use is taken from Peragine (2004b). We consider a society of
individuals, where each individual income or, in general, achievement, is causally
determined by two classes of factors, circumstances and responsibility. We then
propose two diﬀerent partitions of the population. The first is a partition into
types, a type being a subset of the total population characterized by homo-
geneity with respect to circumstances. The second is a partition into tranches,
a tranche being the subset of people who have exercised the same level of ef-
fort. In this framework, by using a social welfare function approach, Peragine
(2002, 2004b) obtains two distinct classes of distributional conditions, typically
expressed in terms of Lorenz and generalized Lorenz dominance: according to
the first class, one distribution is preferred to another distribution if, and only
if, the former dominates the latter at any tranche; whereas the second, weaker
criterion, requires dominance of the types-mean distributions. The first class of
conditions are close in spirit to the welfare criterion proposed by Roemer (1993),
while the second are related to the welfare criterion proposed in van de Gaer
2A recent literature has explored diﬀerent aspects and applications of the opportunity
egalitarian theory for the design of public policy: for an application within the optimal taxation
framework, see Roemer 1998, Roemer et al. 2003, Aaberge et al. 2003; within the fair division
literature, see Bossert 1995, Fleurbaey 1995, Fleurbaey and Maniquet 2003; an application to
the problem of education financing is contained in Betts and Roemer, 1998.
3Clearly the two issues are closely related. For instance, in the same way as the theory
of income tax progressivity and redistribution is based on the theory of income inequality, a
metric of opportunity inequality is necessary in order to evaluate the impact of an opportunity
egalitarian policy (on this see Peragine 2004a).
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(1993).
While these dominance conditions have a strong normative appeal, nonethe-
less they generate partial rankings: often these criteria will fail to rank real
world income distributions4. Ruiz-Castillo (2000) and Villar (2004) propose
complete welfare rankings based on total or average income and Theil’s in-
equality measure5. In this paper the focus is on inequality, rather than welfare
rankings. Therefore, in order to obtain complete ranking of distributions, we
propose an approach based on a member of the entropy family of inequality
indices, well-known for its decomposability properties.
3 The analytical framework
We have a society of N individuals. Each individual is completely described by
a list of traits, which can be partitioned into two diﬀerent classes: traits beyond
the individual responsibility, represented by a person’s set of circumstances O,
belonging to a finite set Ω =
©
O1, ..., On
ª
; and factors for which the individual is
fully responsible, eﬀort for short, represented by a scalar variable w ∈ Θ ⊆ <+.
In this paper we consider as a primitive an ordering Â over Ω, assumed to be
antisymmetric, so that, in general, Oi+1 Â Oi for i ∈ {1, ..., n−1}. Hence we are
able to rank individuals according to their circumstances. An example would
be a ranking based on parental education or parental status. We assume that
all individuals have the same degree of access to the set Θ of possible values
of eﬀort; however, the value actually chosen by each individual is unobservable.
Income6 is generated by a function g : Ω × Θ → <+, that assigns individual
incomes to combinations of eﬀort and circumstances: x = g(O,w).
It is crucial to notice that by eﬀort in this paper it is meant not only the
extent to which a person exerts himself, but all the other background traits of
the individual that might aﬀect his success, but that are excluded from the list
of circumstances. Clearly, diﬀerent partitions of the individual traits into cir-
cumstances and eﬀort correspond to diﬀerent notions of equality of opportunity.
We do not know the form of the function g, hence we do not make any
assumption about the degree of sostituitability or complementarity between
eﬀort and circumstances; this issue, which is indeed important at an empirical
level, is not specified in order to keep the approach as general as possible. We
assume, however, that the function g is fixed and it is the same for all individuals.
A society income distribution is represented by a vector X = {x1, ..., xN} ∈ <N+ .
Next, we assume that the income function g it is increasing in both circum-
stances and responsibility:
Assumption 1 For any w ∈ Θ, g(Oi+1, w) > g(Oi, w) ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}.
Assumption 2 g ismonotonically increasing in w .
4 In fact, it is the case of our empirical analysis: the dominance conditions characterized in
Peragine (2004b) fail to rank the distributions.
5 See also Goux and Maurin (2003).
6 In this section we will use the term ”income” to indicate any form of individual achieve-
ment.
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Let DN := {X ∈ RN+ : Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied} and let us
denote by D :=
S
N∈ND
N the set of admissible income distributions.
Although fairly reasonable from a theoretical viewpoint, assumptions 1 and 2
pose an important empirical question: are the empirical distributions we observe
belonging to the set DN? In other words, are assumptions 1 and 2 satisfied in
real world distributions? We shall see that our sample distributions do satisfy
these crucial assumptions.
We now propose two diﬀerent partitions of the total population. First, given
the ordering defined over Ω, we can partition any population into n subpopula-
tions, each representing a class identified by the variable O. For Oi ∈ Ω, we call
”type i” the set of individuals whose set of circumstances is Oi. Letting NXi be
the number of people in type i of distribution X, such that Σni=1NXi = NX , we
denote by xi = {x1i , ..., xN
X
i
i } ∈ <N
X
i
+ the type i income distribution. Thus the
income profile X ∈ <NX+ can be written as
X = {x1, ...,xi, ...,xn} ∈ <NX+ . (1)
The second partition is based on the responsibility w: for all degrees of respon-
sibility w ∈ Θ, we call tranche w the set of individuals whose responsibility
level is equal to w. As we are considering the case of non-observability of the
responsibility variable, we need to deduce the degree of responsibility exercised
from some observable behavior. More precisely, we need a proxy in order to
measure in an ordinal sense and to compare the eﬀort of diﬀerent individuals.
The idea is the following.
In each type i there will be a distribution of eﬀort; given the circumstances,
which are common for all the individuals in the same type, and the function g,
there will ensue a distribution of income. These distributions will diﬀer across
types; note however that the distribution function is a characteristic of the
type, not of any individual. Equality of opportunity holds that individuals
should not be held responsible for their circumstances, that is, for their type.
In constructing an inter-type- comparable measure of eﬀort, we must therefore
take account of the fact that some individuals come from types with ’good’
distributions of eﬀort, and some from types with ’poor’ distributions. Roemer
therefore suggests to take the inter-type comparable measure of eﬀort to be the
quantile of the eﬀort distribution in his type at which an individual sits; this,
given the monotonicity of the income function, will correspond to the quantile
in the income distribution of the type. We say that all individuals at the pth
quantile of their income distributions, across types, have tried equally hard.
Using the quantile measure of eﬀort sterilizes out the ’good’ or ’bad’ nature of
the distribution of eﬀort in the type.
Thus, considering types 1, ..., n, we define the tranche p in population N as
the subset of individuals whose incomes are at the pth rank of their respective
type income distributions. We have m quantiles, denoted by p ∈ {1, ...,m}.
Working in a discrete framework, we need to assume that, for all i ∈ {1, ..., n},
NXi is divisible by m. Considering a given type i, with the relevant income
vector xi ∈ <N
X
i
+ , let us denote the vector of incomes in quantile p of type i
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by χi,p ∈ <
NXi
m . Analogously to the types-partition introduced before, we can
now construct a disjoint exhaustive partition of the population into tranches.
If N
X
i
m is the number of people in quantile p of type i, then Σ
n
i=1
NXi
m =
N
m is
the number of individuals in any tranche p. Thus, the subset of the population,
identified by type, who have exercised responsibility p, is represented by the
following tranche p vector, χp = {χ1,p, ...,χn,p} ∈ <
N
m
+ , with the relevant mean
income denoted by µXp . Accordingly, the income profile X ∈ <N+ can now also
be written as
X =
©
χ1, ...,χp, ...,χm
ª
∈ <N+ . (2)
Notice that, given DN , the set of feasible income profiles, the types populations
Ni, i ∈ {1, ..., n}, are not predetermined; thus we consider income distributions
with diﬀerent types partitions.
Now compare the formulation in (1) with that given in (2). They dictate
two diﬀerent approaches to measure opportunity inequality. The first approach
focus on the types income distributions and is based on the following definition
of equality of opportunity:
Definition 1 The types approach. There is EOp if and only if the expected
value of income is the same, regardless of the type.
Thus, the types approach puts special emphasis on ex ante inequalities be-
tween people endowed with the same social circumstances: accordingly, one
interprets the inequality within types as mainly due to diﬀerential eﬀorts, and
the inequality between types as generated by the diﬀerent circumstances.
The second approach instead focus on the actual distributions across indi-
vidual at the same level of eﬀort, and is based on the following definition of
equality of opportunity:
Definition 2 The tranches approach. There is EOp if and only if all those
who exerted the same degree of eﬀort have the same chances of achieving the
objective, regardless of the type.
Thus, the tranche approach emphasizes inequalities within eﬀort groups:
an aggregation of such tranches inequalities will provide us with a measure of
the overall opportunity inequality. On the other hand, diﬀerences between the
tranches are interpreted as diﬀerent rewards due to people autonomous choice,
and are not considered as unfair.
Both approaches look as plausible evaluation strategies consistent with the
EOp principle. Moreover, as shown in the example below, they can provide
us with very diﬀerent rankings of society in terms of EOp. Therefore we shall
explore both the types and tranche approaches; within each procedure, we shall
try and decompose overall inequality in an ”ethically oﬀensive” and an ”ethically
acceptable” part.
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3.1 An example
Let us consider a society where individuals’ incomes depend on their parents’
educational attainments and their level of eﬀort. Suppose the society agree to
consider inequalities due to parental education as unjust, while regard inequali-
ties due to individual eﬀort as just. Society agrees also on a ranking of parental
educational attainments. There are three levels of parental educational attain-
ments (N: No school; P: primary, S: secondary), and two levels of eﬀort (Low,
High). Hence the society can be represented by a 3 × 2 matrix. Consider the
following example:
Society 1
parents education (c)/eﬀort level (e) Low High
No education 10 20
Primary school 20 30
Secondary school 30 40
Society 2
parents education (c)/eﬀort level (e) Low High
No education 10 20
Primary school 10 40
Secondary school 10 60
The rows correspond to the types; the columns to the tranches. The two
societies share a basic feature: ceteris paribus, it is better to have a better ed-
ucated parent, and to exert a higher level of eﬀort. However, the two societies
diﬀer in the extent to which eﬀort and social circumstances are combined to pro-
duce income. More precisely, we assume that the eﬀort e is a dummy variable:
elow = 0; ehigh = 1; and that the circumstances are represented by a variable c
such that: c = 1 if no education; c = 2 if primary school ; c = 3 if secondary
school.
Society 1 is generated by the function
x = f1 (c, e) = 10(c+ e)
While society 2 is generated by the function
x = f2 (c, e) = 10 + 10 (e (c− e) + (c× e))
Hence, society 1 corresponds to the case where the income function is ad-
ditively separable in circumstances and eﬀort: the two factors are perfect sub-
stitutes. In contrast, society 2 corresponds to the case where having a well-
educated parent is an advantage for the high eﬀort individuals only.
An inspection of the tables above shows that, according to the types ap-
proach, society 1 and society 2 exhibit the same level of opportunity inequality
(as they have the same types means); on the other hand, according to the
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tranche approach society 1 shows more eﬀort inequality than society 27. We
have proved that the types and the tranche approach may generate diﬀerent
rankings of distributions.
4 Measuring and decomposing opportunity in-
equality
4.1 The tranches approach
In this section we focus on the following representation of an opportunity-
responsibility-income distribution. We have the income profile
X =
©
χ1, ...,χp, ...,χm
ª
, where the tranche p vector, ∀p ∈ {1, ...,m} , is
defined as: χp = {χ1,p, ...,χn,p} ∈ <
N
m
+ .
Consider the set of incomes within a given quantile p of any type i, denoted
by χi,p. Within χi,p there will be diﬀerent income levels; however, as we are
taking the quantile as a proxy for the unobservable responsibility, all individu-
als with income in χi,p are considered as having exercised the same degree of
responsibility; no matter the slight diﬀerences among their incomes. That is
to say, any income inequality within χi,p is not explained by our model, and
it is considered as normatively irrelevant. Therefore, starting from an income
profile X =
©
χ1, ...,χp, ...,χm
ª
∈ DN we can generate an artificial distribution
XS ∈ DN by substituting, to each income x ∈ χi,p, for all i ∈ {1, ..., n} and
for all p ∈ {1, ...,m} , the arithmetic mean of the vector χi,p, denoted by µXi,p.
Hence, with this transformation, denoting by 1i,m the unit vector of length
NXi
m ,
we obtain the new ”smoothed” vector8 χSi,p = {µXi,p1i,m} ∈ D
NXi
m . Accordingly,
the ”smoothed ” tranche p vector, for all p ∈ {1, ...,m} , can now be defined as
χSp = {χS1,p, ...,χSi,p, ...,χSn,p} ∈ D
N
m and the smoothed income profile XS can be
defined as:
XS =
¡
χS1 , ...,χSp , ...,χSm
¢
∈ DN . (1)
In this section we are interested in finding criteria to ranking distributions to
which the above defined smoothing transformation has been applied. Hence,
for all X,Y ∈ DN , we denote by χSp ,νSp and by XS , Y S the relevant smoothed
vectors. For simplicity, we will refer to these simply as the tranche and the
population vectors respectively.
7To see this, notice the following: (i) the income vector corresponding to column Low in
society 1 shows the same level of inequality as the column High in society 2, for any scale
invariant measure of inequality; (ii) the column High in society 1 show more inequality than
the column Low in society 2 - which in fact does not shows any inequality at all. Hence, for any
scale invariant, additively decomposable inequality meaure, and for any weithing scheme used
to compute the within tranche inequality term, society 2 will be declared more opportunity
equal than society 1 according to the tranche approach.
8 Smoothing transformations analogous to the one introduce here could be formulated by
using any other ”representative income”, such as the geometric or harmonic mean or the
equally distributed equivalent income (on this see Foster and Shneyerov 2000). Here we use
the arithmetic mean because we want to preserve the same total income.
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Notice that with this transformation all the unexplained inequality in our
model is canceled out: all the inequality we observe is only attributable to
the circumstances Oi or to the eﬀort level w. Clearly, an empirical question
here arises: how important is the transformation X → XS? As we’ll see in
the empirical part of the paper, this smoothing transformation has a fairly
acceptable impact over the original distribution.
We want to distinguish the overall inequality observed in the income vector
XS ∈ DN into: inequality due to opportunity inequality and inequality due
to individual responsibility. Now, according to the assumptions introduced in
section 2, we can say that the within-tranches inequality is to be interpreted
as income inequality due to opportunity inequality; on the other hand, the
between tranches inequality surely reflects inequality in the exercise of individual
responsibility.
Consider the three following reference vectors:
(a) XS =
¡
χS1 , ...,χSp , ...,χSm
¢
∈ DN
(b) XSB =
³
µχS1 1Nm
, ..., µχSp 1Nm
, ..., µχSm1Nm
´
∈ DN
(c) XSW =
¡
x˜S1 , ..., x˜
S
p , ..., x˜
S
m
¢
∈ DN
where µχSp is the mean of the tranche p income vector, 1Nm is the unit vector of
length Nm , and x˜p,∀p ∈ {1, ...,m} is obtained by rescaling each income µXi,p in
the following way:
∀i ∈ {1, ..., n} ,∀p ∈ {1, ...,m} , µXi,p →
µX
µχSp
µXi,p.
The distributionXS is the overall income vector; XSB is a hypothetical smoothed
distribution in which each person’s income is replaced with the mean income
of the tranche to which he or she belongs. This smoothing process removes all
inequality within the tranches; XSW is a standardized distribution obtained by
proportionally scaling each tranche distribution until it has the same mean as
the overall distribution. Standardization suppresses between-tranche inequality
while leaving tranche inequality levels unaltered.
The interpretation in the current context is as follows. The artificial vector
XSB is the distribution obtained by eliminating opportunity inequality. An in-
equality index applied to this distribution captures only and fully the inequality
due to individual responsibility. On the other hand, by rescaling all tranches
distributions until all tranches have the same mean income, we are left with an
income vector
¡
XSW
¢
in which the only inequality present is the within-tranches
inequality: an inequality index applied to this distribution captures only and
fully the income inequality due to opportunity inequality.
Therefore, considering any two income distributions X,Y ∈ DN , and a given
measure of inequality I : DN → <, we can say that distribution X exhibits a
lower degree of opportunity inequality than distribution Y if and only if
I
¡
XSW
¢
< I
¡
Y SW
¢
.
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Moreover, we can use a decomposable measure of inequality9 and have a de-
composition as follows:
I
¡
XS
¢
= I
¡
XSB
¢
+ I
¡
XSW
¢
By expressing I
¡
XSW
¢
as a residual, we have the following decomposition:
I
¡
XSW
¢
= I
¡
XS
¢
− I
¡
XSB
¢
which is to be interpreted as: Opportunity inequality = Total inequality - Eﬀort
inequality.
4.2 The types approach
In this section we present an analysis similar to the one presented in the previous
section, but focusing now on the types approach.
Consider now the following reference vectors:
(a0) X = (x1, ...,xi, ...,xn) ∈ DN
(b0) XB =
¡
µx1N1 , ..., µxi1Ni , ..., µxn1Nn
¢
∈ DN
(c0) XW = (x˜1, ..., x˜i, ..., x˜n) ∈ DN
where we recall that µxi is the mean of the type i income vector, and x˜i,∀i ∈{1, ..., n} is obtained by rescaling each type i income in the following way:
∀i ∈ {1, ..., n} ,∀h ∈ {1, ..., Ni} , xhi →
µX
µxi
xhi
In this case, (a0) is the overall income vector, (b0) eliminates within-types in-
equality, and (c0) eliminates between-types inequality.
The interpretation is as follows. By measuring the inequality in the artifi-
cial vector XB, obtained by replacing each income with its type mean income
µxi,. , we capture only and fully the between-types inequality, which, in turn,
in the types approach reflects the opportunity inequality. On the other hand,
by rescaling all types distributions until all types have the same mean income,
we are left with an income vector (XW ) in which the only inequality present
is the within-types inequality, to be interpreted as inequality due to individual
9To obtain a decomposition as the one proposed in the text - which holds for a general
class of representative incomes, not only the arithmetic mean - one needs to use a "path
independent" inequality measure as defined and characterized by Foster and Shneyrov (2000).
In the empirical application we’ll use the mean logarithmic deviation (MLD), which is the
only index which has a path-independent decomposition using the arithmetic mean as the
representative income. For a distribution X, with mean µX and size N, the MLD is defined
as:
MLD (X) =
1
N
NX
i=1
ln
µX
xi
10
responsibility. Therefore, considering any two income distributions X,Y ∈ DN ,
and a given measure of inequality I, we say that distribution X exhibits a lower
degree of opportunity inequality than distribution Y if and only if
I (XB) < I (YB) .
Just as in the previous section, we can use a "path independent" measure of
inequality I, and we obtain the following decomposition:
I (XB) = I (X)− I (XW )
which is interpreted as: Opportunity inequality = Total income inequality -
Responsibility inequality.
5 The empirical analysis
Any empirical application of the theory described in the previous sections re-
quires the identification of the concepts of individual objective and of the relevant
list of circumstances. In this paper, we present two applications of the proposed
decomposition of inequality, which diﬀer in terms of the individual objective:
the first application deals with actual earnings, and is directly connected to the
human capital approach; the second one considers the distribution of cognitive
abilities among students, and therefore refers to inequalities existing before the
access to the market. However, in both applications we are concerned with the
same set of circumstances, represented by the family background, which is in
turn measured by the level of parents’ education.
5.1 The first application: the distribution of labour earn-
ings
In the first application we choose income as the selected objective, and we study
the eﬀect of the family background on individual earnings. Now, we could
identify the following channels through which parents aﬀect the income earning
capacity of their children ( see Dardanoni et al. 2004 - check in reference the
year is 1993 ):
a) provision of social connections which are relevant in the labour market;
b) formation of beliefs and skills in children, through family culture and
investment;
c) genetic transmission of native ability;
d) instillation of preferences and aspirations.
Clearly, various notions of equality of opportunity correspond to diﬀerent
choices of which of these channels are to be regarded as circumstances. Now,
also on the basis of the data available, we declare that only factors a) and b)
count as circumstances. Factors a) and b) are proxied, in our analysis, by the
level of parents’ education. This amounts to say that any other factors, as native
11
ability, race, luck, and so on, are implicitly classified as within the sphere of in-
dividual responsibility. If, even under this extremely conservative view of what
constitutes responsibility, our society exhibits a certain degree of inequality of
opportunity for income, then we are legitimate to conclude that a ”minimal”
compensatory policy should be predicated on family characteristics of the indi-
viduals. Put it diﬀerently, our analysis is able to identify only the lower bound
of opportunity inequality. Consequently, the extent of the compensatory inter-
vention dictated by such a minimalist view of individual responsibility should
be viewed only as a lower bound for a global redistributive program.
We draw data on individual annual earnings and family background from
the Survey on the Income and Wealth of Italian Households (SHIW), waves
1993, 1995, 1998 and 2000. Conducted any other year by the Bank of Italy, the
survey collects data on representative samples of approximately ten thousands
of Italian households each wave. Respondents provide information on parent0s
education and occupation, their own educational achievement and other demo-
graphic variables10. We have restricted the sample to observations with positive
earnings from dependent employment (given the low reliability of self-decleared
incomes from self-employed). The survey asks for net earnings; based on exist-
ing fiscal laws and information about family composition, we have reconstructed
the gross earnings.
Family backgrounds is measured by the highest educational attainment in
the couple of parents. Local labour markets are taken into account by splitting
the sample into Northern regions and Central-Southern regions. Overall we
consider 18024 observations11 (see table 1). In accordance with the literature
on determinants of earnings (see the review in Card 1999), since individual
earnings varies according to many other observable characteristics that we want
to ignore (like gender or age), we have regressed actual gross earnings on some
controls (gender, experience and experienced squared12, survey years) and we
have taken the residuals from this regression. This variable represents earnings
obtained by an average person (“average” gender and experience) measured in
Italian liras at 2000 prices. Descriptive statistics are reported in table 2. It is
easy to note that earnings are increasing in the level of parental background,
and they are also higher in the North than in the South by an average of 12%
(but the gap is decreasing with the parental background). By “clearing” the
data from individual heterogeneity based on gender and experience we reduce
measured inequality, as it can be appreciated by comparing the first and the
second columns of table 3, reporting alternative measures of inequality.
But data are still “contaminated” by unobservable components (like ability
10We could not use surveys collected before 1993, because information about
parental background was absent. The English version of the questionnaire, data
and survey documentation can be downloaded from the Bank of Italy web site:
http://www.bancaditalia.it/statistiche/ibf.
11The Bank of Italy survey contains a panel component of approximately one-third of the
interviewed. We have retained this component in order to save observations. This implies
that the same individual may appear more than once in our sample.
12Due to the lack of information about actual experience in the survey, we have calculated
potential experience as (age− years of education− 6).
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or luck) that may confound the analysis of inequality. Under the maintained
assumption that individuals at the same percentile of earning distribution have
exerted the same degree of eﬀort, we have partitioned the earnings distribu-
tion (conditional on parental background and macroregion of residence) into 20
quantiles, and we have replaced individual (predicted) income with the average
income of each cell (20 quantiles × 5 types of background × 2 macroregions).
As it can be judged by comparing the second and third column of table 3, the
reduction in measured earnings inequality is rather limited.
We are now in the condition of analyzing two earnings distributions, in
the North and in the Centre-South, according to two characteristics, parental
education and individual eﬀort, having dispensed for individual heterogeneity
and unobservable components.
The data satisfy our initial assumptions: rank ordering within each quantile
is respected (implicating that eﬀectively the income function is strictly increas-
ing in opportunity) for both regions (see table 4). This is rather unsurprising,
given the high impact of parental education on attained education. However, if
all the eﬀect of parental background would pass onto children through parental
education, we should observe an insignificant impact once we control for at-
tained education. This is not the case, when we look at table 7. In the first
two columns we have regressed individual (log)earnings on gender, work expe-
rience and parental education. In third and fourth columns we introduce the
educational attainment of the interviewed, and the impact of parental education
declines but remains significant, especially in Southern regions.
The main results of our analysis are summarized in tables 5 and 6 and
in figure 1. According to the tranche approach (see table 5), hence when in-
equality of income attributable to inequality of opportunity is calculated by
percentile over types and macroregion (within tranche inequality), we obtain
that inequality of opportunity is equal to 0.0079 in Center-South and 0.0038 in
North. Therefore the inequality of opportunity is double in Southern regions;
moreover, the gap is concentrated in lowest percentiles (with reversed situation
in upper percentiles - see figure 1). When we consider the inequality of income
attributable to inequality of responsibility/eﬀort, we calculate the inequality in-
dex between tranches for each region, obtaining respectively a measure of 0.073
in Center-South and 0.061 in North. Since eﬀort inequality is in the same order
of magnitude between regions, whereas inequality of opportunity was double in
the Center-South, as a consequence inequality of opportunity accounts for 1/10
of earnings inequality in Southern regions and just 1/20 in Northern ones. This
is consistent with finding less mobility in South than in the North of Italy, even
if it exhibit a converging trend.13 As long as parental education reduces its
impact onto educational attainment of younger cohorts, the benefits in terms of
inequality reduction will accrue more to the South than to the North. Analogous
size eﬀects are found when we follow a “type” approach (see table 6): inequality
of opportunity is almost double in Southern regions, and its incidence is lower
in Northern regions.
13See Checchi and Dardanoni (2002).
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Not surprisingly, our results are consistent with standard regression analysis
(as reported in table 7). When parental education is measured by dummy vari-
ables, we find that they bear a coeﬃcient which is almost double in the South
than in the North when we exclude the educational attainment of the individual
(first two columns), whereas it goes up to three-four times when the educational
attainment is included (third and fourth column). This regression helps us to
understand why the inequality of opportunity is higher in the South: while most
of the parental background exert its eﬀect through favouring the educational at-
tainment of the children in the North, it keeps on playing a role independently
from education in the South. This could represent the impact that family net-
working play in finding good jobs. But it could also be related to the social
capital: since parental background is correlated with the average educational
attainment of the environment, the positive eﬀect of parental education (once
we control for educational attainment of the child - see fourth column in table
7) could also represent a sort of “peer eﬀect” during the educational career, that
later on manifests itself in higher earnings14 .
We have also performed some robustness checks, by considering the role of
migration in shaping this outcome. Despite not having a direct measure on
whether an interviewed is a migrant, we can observe the region of birth and the
region of actual residence. By defining migrant a person born in one macro-
region and living in the other (thus excluding local migration), we have 2.0% in
the South and 16.9% in the North. This category is a mixed one, since includes
individual who migrated following their parents (which therefore contributed to
the inequality of opportunity) and individuals who migrated by their own (thus
contributing to the inequality of eﬀort). By excluding these individuals from
the analysis, we observe a decline of inequality mainly in the North, more on
the inequality of opportunity than on the inequality of eﬀort: the former passes
from 0.00389 to 0.00287, while the latter declines from 0.0610 to 0.0548.
5.2 The second application: the distribution of cognitive
abilities
In a similar way to earnings, we have analyzed the eﬀect of family background
on the distribution of cognitive abilities. The analysis is based on data from
the program PISA (Program for International Student Assessment), a program
sponsored by OECD and conducted every three years in more than 30 countries.
This survey was conducted for the first year in 2000 to assess reading ability of
15-year-old students. Students are required to sit a 3-hour test, which is meant
to assess reading literacy15 ; the test score is standardized to an international
mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100. Among the most striking results
of this survey there is the wide school heterogeneity within Italy. In 2000, the
country average score in a sample of 4946 students was 491. But there were
14See the analysis in the next section.
15 “Reading literacy — performing diﬀerent kinds of reading tasks, such as forming a broad
general understanding retrieving specific information, developing an interpretation or reflect-
ing on the content or form of the text.” (OECD-PISA 2000, p.13).
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large diﬀerences across five macro-regions, even conditioning by school types:
the average score in high schools in North-Western regions was 572 against 503
in the South; the corresponding values for vocational schools were 473 and 398,
respectively. But the region of living and mostly the type of secondary school
attended are out of the control of a 15-year-old youngster, and could reasonably
be considered as aﬀecting the opportunity set.16 As before, we have summa-
rized family background through the educational attainment of parents, which is
slightly more detailed than in the SHIW survey, distinguishing between diﬀerent
types of secondary school attended by parents.17 Looking at table 8, we notice
that students’ abilities are increasing in parental education, and are constantly
higher in Northern regions. In order to reduce the heterogeneity of the test
scores, we have controlled for gender and age, obtaining the presumed ability of
a representative student (see table 9). The replacement of actual ability with
theoretically predicted one leaves the distribution practically unaltered, as it
can easily checked in table 10. Even replacing individual ability with the mean
ability of a representative individual with the same parental background, living
in the same macro-area and exerting the same amount of eﬀort, does not reduce
measured inequality of abilities.
Once more, we introduce the assumption that individuals at the same per-
centile of ability distribution have exerted the same degree of eﬀort. This as-
sumption may be questioned in the context of student surveys. One could obtain
a very high test score because either she is a natural genius, or because she was
lucky enough to meet extraordinary teachers in the course of her life, or even
because she is the daughter of school professors. In all cases her performance has
nothing to do with her eﬀort. However, had not she exerted some eﬀort, other
things constant her performance would have been lower. Under the present as-
sumption about eﬀort distribution, we now look at the ability distributions in
the two regions (see table 11). Our analysis suﬀer from the limited number of
observations in many cells, which has required the reduction of the number of
quantiles from 20 to 10, and also the grouping of illiterate parents with par-
ents with primary education. This explain why we observe three cases of rank
reversal of the average ability defined over type/decile/region.
As before, the main result of our proposed decomposition is reported in
16We are implicitly assuming that the type of school attended is independent of the eﬀort
exerted by the student. Two justifications are in order. The first one refers to the institutional
nature of the Italian educational system, where the type of upper secondary school is made at
the age of 13, by the family after some counselling from the school professors. The second one
is that when we model the choice of the secondary school attended in the PISA dataset, we
find that parental education and past school performance (whether been retarded in the past)
are both correlated with the current school attendance. For both reasons we feel justified in
considering the type of school as the result of a direct choice of parents. One could object that
a lazy student would have obtained a scarce performance in the previous school level (lower
secondary), would have been oriented to a “light” secondary school, and therefore the choice
of the secondary school would reflect eﬀort instead of background.
17Due to missing information on parental education, the actual sample reduces to 4769
students. Remember that this sample is non representative of the corresponding age cohort,
since upper secondary school is not compulsory in Italy, and typically students from worst
background tend not to enrol.
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tables 12 (tranche approach) and 13 (type approach). The inequality of oppor-
tunities is almost the double in the Southern region when compared to Northern
one, and their incidence on total inequality is higher (respectively 7.2% versus
5.3%). This is true whatever is the way in which we measure the inequality
of opportunity, either the “tranches” or the “types” approach. The inequality
of opportunity aﬀect disproportionately the students in the bottom tail of the
score distribution, as shown by figure 2.
Why are students in Southern schools more unequal in terms of cognitive
abilities ? Regression analysis, reported in table 14, help us to shed some light
on this issue. As expected, the measured ability of student is correlated with
parental education (column 1 and 2), but the impact is 3− 5 percentage points
higher in the South.18 If the ability acquired after 10 years of formal schooling
is the outcome of an educational production function, where parental education,
school resources and environmental eﬀects all play a role, and if family resources
and school resources are substitutes in this production function19, then a higher
impact of parental education is a signal of lower school resources invested in this
region.20 When we introduce the type of secondary school attended (column 3
and 4), we observe that the impact of parental education almost disappears in
the Northern region, while is remains significant in the South. This could indi-
cate that, despite students being sorted according to their family backgrounds
diﬀerent tracks, within each track the family of origin still matter wherever the
quality of education provided by the local school remains limited.
6 Concluding remarks
The philosophy of equality of opportunity suggests that social and economic
inequalities due to factors beyond the individual responsibility are inequitable
and to be compensated by society; whereas inequalities due to personal re-
sponsibility are equitable and not to be compensated. Therefore, according to
the opportunity egalitarian conception, in order to assess the equitability of a
state of aﬀairs one has to distinguish, in a given distribution of outcomes, the
inequalities due to personal responsibility as opposed to the inequalities due
to non responsible factors or opportunities. In this paper we have provided
a theoretically sound methodology to measure opportunity inequality and to
decompose overall inequality in an ”ethically oﬀensive” and an ”ethically ac-
ceptable” part. Moreover, we have provided an empirical application of these
new evaluation tools, and shown how they compare with standard methods of
income inequality measurement and opportunity inequality measurement.
18For comparability reasons with table 7, we have chosen to use the log of the test score
instead of the actual level.
19 See Checchi 2004 for an estimation of such a production function for Italy. See Brunello
and Checchi 2003 for the discussion of the substitutability/complementarity issue in the case
of Italy.
20This is consistent with what is found in the literature: see Aspis 2003, where a non
representative sample of Italian students is analyzed, finding that on average a student in
Southern regions receive less resources (in the order of 500 euros per student per year).
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We have compared two Italian macro-regions, South and Centre-North, ac-
cording to equality of opportunity. In the first application we have focused on
individual earnings, while in the second we have considered the distribution of
cognitive abilities among students; in both cases we have studied how these
diﬀerent individual achievements vary according to the family background, as
measured by the level of parents’ education. Our main findings are that, in both
applications, the less developed regions in the South are characterized by greater
disparities at the global level. In addition they also suﬀer of greater incidence
of inequality of opportunity. According to our results, parents’ education play
a great role in the level of individual achievements, and this eﬀect is stronger in
the South than in the North.
Common to many other less developed regions, Southern Italian regions ex-
perience the worse of possible worlds: lower per-capita income accompanied by
greater overall income inequality, whose a larger fraction is ethically inequitable.
This situation seems pervasive, since we observe it at the earlier stage of school-
ing careers (when people is still in school) as well as later on in the labour market.
One wonders whether these territorial disparities may be addressed by appropri-
ate policies. To begin with, our results point to the role of educational policies.
Given the greater inequality of opportunity, it is harder to excel in school in
the South than in the Centre-North of Italy: at comparable level of eﬀort, a
culturally poorer background is more limiting in the situation where parental
background is more eﬀective. As long as family resources and school resources
are substitutes in the (underlying) educational production function, a higher
impact of parental education is a signal of lower school resources invested in
these regions. Here we derive our first policy indication: more resources should
be invested in the schools of Southern regions in order to reduce the disparities
in terms of inequality of opportunity.
The same type of diﬃculty seems to emerge in the labour market. Gifted
individuals are at a greater disadvantage in the South than in the North when
coming from lower social origins. This could represent the impact of family
networking in finding good jobs, as well as a reduced availability of good jobs
in less technologically advanced areas. This greater obstacles and/or lack of
adequate incentives in local labour markets can be linked to existing evidence
of internal migration flows (see Viesti 2005), which speaks of a sort of “brain
drain”, that is strong migration of high skilled workers from the South towards
the Northern regions. While part of this migration is certainly explained by the
diﬀerent unemployment rates, it is plausible - and it will be indeed interesting to
verify empirically - that the choice to migrate is specially concentrated among
individuals with poor family background.
If greater inequality of opportunities in the labour market originates from
the opaque working of the labour market, there are no easy solutions. Favour-
ing external migration reduces the inequality of opportunities as measured ex
post, but not ex ante. In addition, it depresses the incentives to emerge, given
the higher obstacles attributable to factors beyond individual controls. Fairer
competition in accessing rationed jobs would constitute the most appropriate
policy, and this can be achieved at some extent in the allocation of public jobs.
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In the private sector, more transparent intermediation could help in compensat-
ing the disadvantage created by diﬀerential backgrounds. But these are rather
ephemeral suggestions, for a country where more than 50% of the working pop-
ulation declares to have obtained the current job through recommendations of
relatives or friends. The final objective of a more fluid society is still a long way
oﬀ.
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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics – Gross earnings – Italy (SHIW) 1993–2000 
first row: mean – second row: standard deviation – third row: observations  
 
Highest educational 
attainment among 
parents 
North Centre–South Total 
no formal education 27912.91 22898.22 24427.48 
 12702.33 12810.93 12982.52 
 806 1,837 2,643 
    
primary school 30706.63 27800.04 29199.57 
 16786.42 16545.32 16724.15 
 4,582 4,934 9,516 
    
lower secondary 33799.69 30012.6 32055.78 
 19434.26 17057.58 18471.92 
 1,700 1,451 3,151 
    
upper secondary 37359.2 33757.34 35628.98 
 24230.18 19316.67 22075.49 
 1,072 991 2,063 
    
bachelor 45221.3 42126.49 43539.26 
 3055.52 34437.09 32675.73 
 308 343 652 
    
Total 32431.77 28325.72 30254.82 
 19096.52 17727.43 18496.72 
 8,468 9,556 18,024 
Note: North includes Piemonte, Val d’Aosta, Liguria, Lombardia, Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia, 
Trentino Alto Adige and Emilia Romagna 
 
Table 2 – Predicted earnings (controlling for gender, experience and survey year)  
first row: mean – second row: standard deviation – third row: observations  
 
Highest educational 
attainment among 
parents 
North Centre–South Total 
no formal education 37015.56 31120.24 32918.06 
 11601.48 12362.02 12432.93 
 806 1,837 2,643 
    
primary school 39717.91 35942.89 37760.58 
 15468.26 15936.08 15824.56 
 4,582 4,934 9,516 
    
lower secondary 43354.4 39110.05 41399.93 
 17973.21 15818.8 17143.47 
 1,700 1,451 3,151 
    
upper secondary 47790.06 44429.84 46175.91 
 21950.38 17917.79 20179.6 
 1,072 991 2,063 
    
bachelor 55420.49 52241 53676.79 
 28118.97 32048.77 30299.22 
 308 343 652 
    
Total 41783.77 36961.85 39227.27 
 17691.43 17042.3 17515.93 
 8,468 9,556 18,024 
Note: the table reports the residuals from the following estimate 
2
)8.20()9.20()3.32(
1998
)6.7(
1995
)3.15(
1993
)8.19()01.38(
exp26exp1299867629625737746333133 ⋅−⋅+⋅−⋅−⋅−⋅−= femaledddearnings  
Since the residuals are centered around zero, they have been added a constant (39225) in order to 
match minimum and maximum of the actual series. 
 
 
Table 3 – Descriptive statistics: inequality measures 
 
Inequality measures Actual gross earnings 
Predicted gross earnings 
(net of gender, experience 
and survey year) 
Mean predicted gross 
earnings (by region, types 
and quantiles) - sX  
Relative mean deviation 0.18956 0.14041 0.14036 
Coefficient of variation 0.61136 0.44652 0.41004 
Standard deviation of logs 0.66238 0.42004 0.39308 
Gini coefficient 0.28406 0.20799 0.20703 
Theil index (GE(α),α=1) 0.15257 0.08110 0.07550 
Mean Log Deviation (GE(α),α=0) 0.17512 0.08043 0.07570 
Entropy index(GE(α), α=−1) 0.34345 1.1e+02 0.08516 
Half(Coeff.Var.squared)(GE(α),α=2) 0.18687 0.09969 0.08406 
 
 
Table 4 – Mean earnings by “types” and “effort” and macro–regions 
first row: mean – second row: observations  
 
North 
quantiles→ 
types↓ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 16689.05 23225.94 25887.26 27791.33 29690.2 31072.9 32209.29 33609.23 34704.79 35654.81 36759.52 37758.36 38744.99 39721.1 41408.04 42736.3 44715.19 46942.58 51868.32 69727.2 
 41 40 40 41 40 40 41 40 40 40 41 40 40 41 40 40 41 40 40 40 
2 17457.04 23997.71 26990.55 28898.56 30497.23 31946.78 33416.19 34709.4 35894.13 37077.61 38298.5 39578.91 40735.97 42085.24 43631.52 45409.3 47730.52 51260.34 58022.27 86840.9 
 230 229 229 229 229 229 229 229 229 229 232 227 230 228 229 229 229 229 229 229 
3 17939.15 25372.05 28778.47 30920.51 32855.19 34568.98 36108.72 37404.05 38755.2 40137.84 41356.97 42775.41 44101.49 45692.34 47684.48 49905.5 52295.08 57240.89 67262.64 95956.4 
 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 86 84 85 85 85 85 85 
4 18580.32 26189.05 30061.17 32854.7 35343.59 37448.55 38973.71 40368.27 41670.64 43083.45 44560.82 45754.83 47389.14 49345.66 51310.64 54125.05 57764.03 64591.25 79386.67 117883.1 
 54 54 53 54 53 54 54 53 54 53 54 54 53 54 53 54 54 53 54 53 
5 19249.2 28521.93 32854.07 35387.42 36581.45 38662.61 41143.27 43649.44 45486.85 47144.99 48745.69 50588.95 52705.31 56045.44 61247.45 67494.63 75958.3 87124.28 102173.8 141914.4 
 16 15 16 15 15 16 15 16 15 15 16 15 16 15 15 16 16 15 15 15 
 
Centre-South 
quantiles→ 
types↓ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 9098.535 14390.67 17327.28 19614.06 21890.45 24012.46 25706.07 27521.68 29015.58 30341.4 31635.74 33002.87 34335.96 35712.88 37481.62 39159.33 41234.07 43721.98 47328.5 60180.67 
 92 92 92 92 92 92 91 92 92 92 92 92 92 91 92 92 92 92 92 91 
2 11967.98 18450.87 22028.43 24844.38 26943.44 28683.65 30121.33 31542.24 33001.11 34352.72 35768.52 37113.32 38458.97 39966.67 41603.79 43356.39 45329.57 47891.2 52592.81 74983.5 
 247 247 247 246 247 247 246 247 247 247 246 247 247 246 247 247 246 247 247 246 
3 14135.1 21144.26 24531.75 27022.88 29183.45 30859.54 32519 34068.32 35562.17 37080.75 38415.05 39741.94 41224.82 42541.11 44223.14 46140.02 48773.7 52155.82 58780.32 84613.44 
 73 73 72 73 72 73 72 73 72 73 73 72 73 72 73 73 72 72 73 72 
4 15520.87 23725.36 28265.38 30720.21 33265.77 35572.9 37256.86 38536.82 39903.12 41695.02 43178.81 44664.1 46381.57 47914.57 49661.29 51964.18 55175.92 60161.25 69025.85 96813.71 
 50 50 49 50 49 50 49 50 49 50 50 49 50 49 50 49 50 49 50 49 
5 16208.08 25559.64 29627.96 33104.68 36095.77 38758.73 40621.6 42153.24 43604.57 45100.73 46227.48 47508.41 49340.98 51512.6 53073.52 56294.4 62292.33 76748.95 96349.72 157482.7 
 18 17 17 17 17 17 18 17 17 17 17 17 17 18 17 17 17 17 17 17 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Inequality of opportunity by macro regions – Italy (SHIW) 1993-2000 
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Table 5 – Inequality decomposition, by macroegions – mean log deviation – 
“tranche” approach 
 
 opportunity inequality 
effort 
inequality 
Total 
inequality 
(mean 
predicted 
earnings 
sX ) 
Total 
inequality 
(predicted 
earnings) 
total 
inequality 
(actual 
earnings) 
North 0.00389 0.06102    0.06491 0.06840    0.15212 
Center-South 0.00793     0.07378    0.08172 0.08754    0.19119 
 
 
Table 6 – Inequality decomposition, by macroegions – mean log deviation – 
“types” approach 
 
 opportunity inequality 
effort 
inequality 
Total 
inequality 
(predicted 
earnings) 
North 0.00429 0.06411 0.06840 
Center-South 0.00742 0.08011 0.08754 
 
Table 7 – Determinants of earnings – Italy (SHIW) 1993–2000 
OLS – robust t–statistics in brackets – * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 1 2 3 4 
 north centre–south north 
centre–
south 
female -0.369 -0.352 -0.385 -0.404 
 [30.47]*** [23.38]*** [33.58]*** [28.32]*** 
potential experience 0.057 0.065 0.057 0.061 
 [17.31]*** [18.28]*** [17.31]*** [17.29]*** 
potential experience squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [15.81]*** [15.98]*** [12.25]*** [11.21]*** 
parent primary (isced 1) 0.099 0.285 0.022 0.164 
 [5.02]*** [14.56]*** [1.17] [9.15]*** 
parent lower secondary (isced 2) 0.235 0.433 0.079 0.203 
 [10.23]*** [17.61]*** [3.53]*** [8.77]*** 
parent upper secondary (isced 3) 0.336 0.626 0.086 0.261 
 [12.89]*** [22.79]*** [3.27]*** [9.61]*** 
parent tertiary (isced 4-5-6) 0.473 0.761 0.088 0.312 
 [11.39]*** [18.63]*** [2.13]** [7.88]*** 
completed years of education   0.062 0.075 
   [32.55]*** [36.47]*** 
Observations 8468 9556 8468 9556 
R² 0.20 0.16 0.29 0.27 
Note: constant and survey year dummies included.  
Dependent variable is the log of gross labour earnings for dependent employees. 
 
Table 8 – Descriptive statistics – Cognitive ability – Italy (PISA) 2000 
first row: mean – second row: standard deviation – third row: observations  
 
Highest educational 
attainment among 
parents 
North Centre–South Total 
487.00 429.88 448.67 no formal education or 
primary school 85.18 79.69 85.68 
 75 153 228 
    
499.60 449.95 467.58 lower secondary (isced 
2) 78.37 87.75 87.78 
 435 790 1,225 
    
517.12 458.00 484.54 upper secondary 
vocational (isced 3 b–c) 82.25 83.22 87.80 
 268 329 597 
    
527.96 488.66 504.72 upper secondary 
academic (isced 3a) 81.99 84.95 85.93 
 705 1,020 1,725 
    
tertiary (isced 5–6) 545.13 496.43 516.22 
 83.41 86.65 88.60 
 404 590 994 
    
Total 521.93 473.02 492.37 
 83.35 88.26 89.59 
 1,887 2,882 4,769 
Note: North includes Piemonte, Val d’Aosta, Liguria, Lombardia, Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia, 
Trentino Alto Adige and Emilia Romagna 
 
Table 9 – Predicted ability (controlling for gender and age)  
first row: mean – second row: standard deviation – third row: observations  
 
Highest educational 
attainment among 
parents 
North Centre–South Total 
466.94 408.47 427.70 no formal education or 
primary school 85.09 79.88 85.97 
 75 153 228 
    
477.34 430.51 447.14 lower secondary (isced 
2) 76.28 86.20 85.77 
 435 790 1,225 
    
494.75 440.69 464.96 upper secondary 
vocational (isced 3 b–c) 80.53 81.29 85.24 
 268 329 597 
    
508.93 469.81 485.80 upper secondary 
academic (isced 3a) 81.15 83.86 84.95 
 705 1,020 1,725 
    
tertiary (isced 5–6) 525.98 478.03 497.52 
 82.70 84.10 86.75 
 404 590 994 
    
Total 501.62 454.14 472.92 
 82.45 86.86 88.25 
 1,887 2,882 4,769 
Note: the table reports the residuals from the following estimate 
eriencefemaleability exp39.146.2947.213
)65.3()5.11()95.2(
⋅+⋅+=  
Since the residuals are centered around zero, they have been added a constant (472.92) in order to 
match minimum and maximum of the actual series. 
 
 
Table 10 – Descriptive statistics: inequality measures 
 
Inequality measures Actual ability Predicted ability (net of gender and age) 
Mean predicted ability (by 
region, types and quantiles) - 
sX  
Relative mean deviation 0.07218 0.07293 0.07278 
Coefficient of variation 0.18423 0.18660 0.18206 
Standard deviation of logs 0.20568 0.21026 0.19317 
Gini coefficient 0.10290 0.10414 0.10309 
Theil index (GE(α),α=1) 0.15688 0.15850 0.15671 
Mean Log Deviation (GE(α),α=0) 0.07592 0.07696 0.07628 
Entropy index(GE(α), α=−1) 0.01078 0.01105 0.01035 
Half(Coeff.Var.squared)(GE(α),α=2) 0.01775 0.01823 0.01704 
 
Table 11 – Mean ability by “types” and “effort” and macro–regions 
first row: mean – second row: observations  
 
North 
quantiles→ 
types↓ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 312.54 395.83 417.12 442.52 461.72 480.82 502.81 524.90 552.15 591.67 
 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 
2 334.38 404.59 431.40 453.01 470.29 487.58 506.43 527.31 553.19 608.36 
 44 43 44 43 45 42 44 44 43 43 
3 357.65 408.25 441.23 465.65 483.09 503.16 525.88 544.32 580.61 642.66 
 27 27 27 27 26 27 27 27 27 26 
4 356.09 431.05 459.60 483.36 502.28 519.09 538.87 566.31 593.95 640.32 
 71 70 71 70 72 69 71 70 71 70 
5 372.26 443.97 475.33 499.01 519.25 538.19 560.78 580.94 609.79 664.67 
 41 40 41 40 41 40 41 40 40 40 
 
Centre-South 
quantiles→ 
types↓ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 266.02 328.34 354.17 376.87 398.67 425.66 441.78 464.86 493.67 544.03 
 16 15 15 16 15 15 16 15 15 15 
2 265.13 342.45 377.68 404.66 428.26 445.83 464.58 488.76 518.19 569.57 
 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 
3 289.94 353.73 389.76 414.86 436.61 454.06 477.48 494.56 521.47 578.59 
 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 32 
4 313.41 384.12 418.93 442.86 465.10 483.74 502.41 523.30 553.19 610.98 
 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 
5 319.06 388.59 425.89 452.92 473.65 492.87 515.89 534.82 561.64 615.00 
 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 
 
 
Figure 2 – Inequality of opportunity by macro regions – Italy (PISA) 2000 
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Table 12 – Inequality decomposition, by macroegions – mean log deviation – 
“tranche” approach – Ability 
 
 opportunity inequality 
effort 
inequality 
Total 
inequality 
(mean 
predicted 
ability sX ) 
Total 
inequality 
(predicted 
ability) 
total 
inequality 
(actual 
ability) 
North 0.000709 0.0126289  0.01334 0.01532    0.01446 
Center-South 0.0013677 0.0174451  0.01881 0.02095    0.02032    
 
 
Table 13 – Inequality decomposition, by macroegions – mean log deviation – 
“types” approach – Ability 
 
 opportunity inequality 
effort 
inequality 
Total 
inequality 
(predicted 
ability) 
North 0.0006801 0.0146399 0.01532    
Center-South 0.0012013 0.0197487 0.02095    
 
 
 
Table 14 – Determinants of cognitive ability – Italy – PISA 2000 
OLS – robust t–statistics in brackets – * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 1 2 3 4 
 north centre– south north 
centre– 
south 
female 0.049 0.073 0.032 0.039 
 [6.18]*** [9.79]*** [4.45]*** [5.62]*** 
Student age in months 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 [3.51]*** [2.46]** [2.22]** [1.62] 
parent lower secondary (isced 2) 0.031 0.047 0.033 0.028 
 [1.06] [2.64]*** [1.15] [1.76]* 
parent secondary vocational (isced 3b-c) 0.066 0.074 0.053 0.042 
 [2.19]** [3.89]*** [1.86]* [2.42]** 
parent secondary academic (isced 3a) 0.092 0.135 0.049 0.063 
 [3.17]*** [7.91]*** [1.76]* [3.97]*** 
parent tertiary (isced 5-6) 0.124 0.153 0.05 0.04 
 [4.24]*** [8.69]*** [1.76]* [2.47]** 
attending vocational school (profess)   0.252 0.347 
   [2.25]** [6.03]*** 
attending technical track (itis)   0.364 0.449 
   [3.26]*** [7.85]*** 
attending academic track (licei)   0.451 0.584 
   [4.03]*** [10.29]***
Observations 1887 2882 1887 2882 
R² 0.06 0.08 0.24 0.29 
Note: constant included. Dependent variable is the log of the test score achieved in reading ability 
